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Mt. Healthy, Causation, and
Affirmative Defenses
by Joseph Z. Fleming'

I.

CAUSATION-THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING

In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, ' the
Supreme Court established a rule of causation to distinguish between a
result caused by a constitutional violation and one not so caused by
establishing "the proper test ... which likewise protects against invasion
of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences
not necessary to the assurance of those rights."2 Reconciling such
inconsistencies is similar to the type of situation that has confounded
physicists trying to achieve a unified field theory-a theory capable of
describing nature's forces within a single, all-encompassing, coherent
framework? Physicists since Einstein have sought such a "unified field
theory" or a "theory of everything" to fashion the ultimate theory of the
universe and to answer questions as to causation and how the universe
arose (and to explain the universe from the "big bang" to the end, or the
"cosmic implosion").4 However, they encountered a major causation
problem:
The problem is this: There are two foundational pillars upon which
modern physics rests. One is Albert Einstein's general relativity,
which provides a theoretical framework for understanding the universe
on the largest of scales: stars, galaxies, clusters of galaxies, and
beyond to the immense expanse of the universe itself. The other is
quantum mechanics, which provides a theoretical framework for

* Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Miami, Florida. University of Florida
(B.A., 1962); University of Virginia (LL.B., 1965); New York University (LL.M., 1966).
1. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
2. Id. at 287.

3.

See BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE 3 (1999).

4. Id. at 4, 234.
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understanding the universe on the smallest of scales: molecules,
atoms, and all the way down to subatomic particles like electrons and
quarks. Through years of research, physicists have experimentally
confirmed to almost unimaginable accuracy virtually all predictions
made by each of these theories. But these same theoretical tools
inexorably lead to another disturbing conclusion:
As they are
currently formulated, general relativity and quantum mechanics cannot
both be right. The two theories underlying the tremendous progress of
physics during the last hundred years-progress that has explained the
expansion of the heavens and the fundamental structure of matter-are mutually incompatible.5
On a less universal scale, courts have struggled with causation issues
that can answer the following questions: (1) whether rights have been
violated and, (2) if so, whether the violations are the cause of decisions
or should be used to negate, or end, decisions. Just as physicists must
try to reconcile inconsistent theories, courts must determine whether
various laws have been violated and must preclude various decisions
when mixed motives are present--one legitimate and one unlawfully
discriminatory-and when both may have caused an unfavorable
employment action. This has been a major problem in connection with
labor and employment matters, and the resolution of the mixed-motive
problem came from the framework established in Mt. Healthy.'
In Mt. Healthy the Court held that an employee can be legally
terminated if the employer can prove that it would have fired the
employee absent the discriminatory motivation.7 In that case an
untenured teacher contended that but for his participation in an exercise
of a First Amendment broadcast over a radio station, the school board
would have renewed his contract. The district court held that the
teacher was entitled to reinstatement with back pay, and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed.' However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded.? The Supreme Court accepted the district court's finding that the
communication was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 10 However, the fact that the communication might have played
a "substantial part" in the board's decision not to renew the teacher's
contract was not a constitutional violation justifying remedial action if

5. Id. at 3.
6. Joseph J. Ward, Note, A Call for Price Waterhouse II: The Legacy of Justice
O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed.Motive Employment Discrimination
Claims, 61 ALB. L. REV. 627, 635 n.57 (1997).
7. 429 U.S. at 287.
8. Id. at 282-87.
9. Id. at 287.
10. Id. at 284.
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the board would have reached the same decision anyway.11 The Court
vacated and remanded because it was unable to determine how the
proper test would have been applied.12
While Mt. Healthy implicated the First Amendment insofar as the
employee asserted that his exercise of his First Amendment rights
caused the discriminatory terminations, the Court, in NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp.,13 extended its holding beyond
constitutional issues connected with employment matters to traditional
labor law issues."' The NLRB adopted the theory established in Mt.
Healthy in connection with its interpretation of the National Labor
Relations Act. 5 The Court approved what is known as the "Wright
Line" test, which allows a termination to stand even if the employer was
motivated by either a desire to punish the plaintiff or other improper
reasons, so long as the employer can show it would have otherwise
terminated the employee or reached the same termination decision. 6
Relying on Mt. Healthy, the court stated,
The [NLRB's] allocation of the burden of proof is clearly reasonable
in [a mixed-motive] context, for the reason stated in NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., a case on which the Board relied when it began taking
the position that the burden of persuasion could be shifted. The
employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared
illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he
knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created not by
innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.
In Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, we found it
prudent, albeit in a case implicating the Constitution, to set up an
allocation of the burden of proof which the Board heavily relied on and
borrowed from in its Wright Line decision. There, we held that the
plaintiff had to show that the employer's disapproval of his First
Amendment protected expression played a role in the employer's
decision to discharge him. If that burden of persuasion were carried,
the burden would be on the defendant to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that he would have reached the same decision even if,
hypothetically, he had not been motivated by a desire to punish

11. Id. at 285.
12. Id. at 287.
13. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).

14. Id. at 403.
15. Id.

16. Id. at 403-04.
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plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights. The analogy to Mt.
Healthy drawn by the Board was a fair one.17

The causation analysis in Mt. Healthy has been adopted in other
circumstances as well. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"8 the Supreme
Court noted it would follow Mt. Healthy when deciding mixed-motive
cases under Title VII:
We have reached a similar conclusion in other contexts where the
law announces that a certain characteristic is irrelevant to the
allocation of burdens and benefits. In Mt. Healthy City Bd.of Ed. v.
Doyle, ... [wie ... held that once the plaintiff had shown that his
constitutionally protected speech was a "substantial" or "motivating
factor" in the adverse treatment of him by his employer, the employer
was obligated to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision as to [the plaintiff] even in the
absence of the protected conduct." A court that finds for a plaintiff
under this standard has effectively concluded that an illegitimate
motive was a "but-for" cause of the employment decision.' 9

The plurality in Price Waterhouse specifically rejected the dissent by
Justice Kennedy,2 ° which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
joined and which attempted to find that analogies to the decisions in Mt.
Healthy and TansportationManagement Corp. were not appropriate
because "these cases were decided in different contexts."2 The dissent
contended that Mt. Healthy was a First Amendment case and not
controlling as to Title VII.22

17. Id. at 403 (citations omitted); see also Joanne S. Marchetta, Note, NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp.: Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Section 8(a)(3)
Mixed Motive Discharge Cases, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 279, 288 (1983) (describing the
approach of the NLRB in resolving motivational issues by using the Court's rationale in
Mt. Healthy),
18. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
19. Id. at 248-49 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287) (citations
omitted) (alteration in original).
20. Id. at 247.
21. Id. at 289 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 289-90.
Closer analogies to the plurality's new approach are found in Mt. Healthy City
Bd.of Ed. v. Doyle and NRLB [sic]v. TransportationManagement Corp., but these
cases were decided in different contexts. Mt. Healthy was a First Amendment
case involving the firing of a teacher, and TransportationManagement involved
review of the NLRB's interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. The
TransportationManagement decision was based on the deference that the Court
traditionally accords NLRB interpretations of the statutes it administers. Neither
case therefore tells us why the established Burdineframework should not continue
to govern the order of proof under Title VII.
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The plurality rejected the dissent's argument:
At some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must
decide whether a particular case involves mixed motives. If the
plaintiff fails to satisfy the factfinder that it is more likely than not
that a forbidden characteristic played a part in the employment
decision, then she may prevail only if she proves, following Burdine,
that the employer's stated reason for its decision is pretextual. The
dissent need not worry that this evidentiary scheme, if used during a
jury trial, will be so impossibly confused and complex as it imagines.
Juries long have decided cases in which defendants raised affirmative
defenses. The dissent fails, moreover, to explain why the evidentiary
scheme that we endorsed over 10 years ago in Mt. Healthy City Bd. of
Ed. v.Doyle has not proved unworkable in that context but would be
hopelessly complicated in a case brought under federal antidiscrimination statutes.23
The foregoing type of affirmative defense, based on analysis of the
causation concept articulated in Mt. Healthy, was disapproved by
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was Congress's reaction
to the Court's decisions in Price Waterhouse and other cases. While
some maintain that Price Waterhouse heightened the employee's burden
and made it more difficult for the employer to rebut a plaintiff's prima
facie case and that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "adopted the plurality
test,"24 the Civil Rights Act of 1991 plainly states that "an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice."2 5
Other approaches to legal causation and analysis have used the mixedmotive approach" and the causation type of analysis from Mt.

Healthy.2 7

Id. (citations omitted).
23. 490 U.S. at 247 n.12 (citations omitted).
24. Ward, supra note 6,at 643 n.5.
25. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m) (1994)).
26. See Mary Teresa Sobnosky, Note, Wright Line and Wrongful Discharge Actions:
A Uniform Standardof Review, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 404, 425 n.159 (1983).
27. See Pamela M. Martey, Note, "The Last Temptation Is the Greatest Treason: To Do
the Right Deed for the Wrong Reason": After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Claims:McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1031,
1044 (1995) (noting that Mt. Healthy was a formulation of a "test of causation which
distinguished between a result obtained, following a constitutional violation and one not
occurring incident to a constitutional violation"). The quote in the foregoing casenote title
is attributed to T.S. Eliot:
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The Supreme Court seems to have created a concept in Mt. Healthy
that can be applied in a way that federalizes, or constitutionalizes,
causation issues in the same fashion as in certain other areas of the
law.2"
As noted, while the causation test in Mt. Healthy was adopted by the
Court in Price Waterhouse, it has been changed by congressional
amendment of Title VII, and the change appears to be a restriction on
the use of the causation rule. However, that does not prevent the Court
from using the causation concept from Mt. Healthy to create other
substantial affirmative defenses, as demonstrated by a trilogy of 1998
decisions.
First, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,29 the
Court precluded sex discrimination suits under Title IX against a school
district. ° Justice Ginsburg's dissent, joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer, noted that dimensions of a claim are determined not only by
plaintiff's allegations, but also by "allowable defenses."" l The dissent
further stated,
In line with the tort law doctrine of avoidable consequences, I would
recognize as an affirmative defense to a Title IX charge of sexual
harassment, an effective policy for reporting and redressing such
misconduct. School districts subject to Title IX's governance have been
instructed by the Secretary of Education to install procedures for
"prompt and equitable resolution" of complaints, and the Department
of Education's Office of Civil Rights has detailed elements of an
effective grievance process, with specific reference to sexual harassment.
The burden would be the school district's to show that its internal
remedies were adequately publicized and likely would have provided

In warning of the moral hazards which confront humanity, T.S. Eliot stated, 'The last
temptation is the greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong reason." [T.S.
ELIOT, MURDER INTHE CATHEDRAL pt. 1.]. Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold appropriately cited T.S. Eliot in his eloquent dissenting opinion in Welch v. Liberty Machine Works
Inc. See Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1406 (8th Cir. 1994)
(Arnold, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1031 n.1. For reasons of poetic justice there is more about T.S. Eliot later.
28. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1963) (using the actual
malice rule to set a standard for defamation cases based upon a constitutional theory,
which has the effect of federalization); see also DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1983) (borrowing of six-month limitation period to restrict
suits under various labor laws that actually do not have such explicit limitation periods for
purposes used by the Supreme Court).
29. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
30. Id. at 292-93.
31. Id. at 306-07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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redress without exposing the complainant to undue risk, effort, or
expense. Under such a regime, to the extent that a plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the school district's preventive and
remedial measures, and consequently suffered avoidable harm, she
would not qualify for Title IX relief. 2
In the second case, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,3" some of the
Justices who dissented in Gebser were in the majority. They concluded
that at least an affirmative defense could be available when no "tangible
employment action is taken." 4 However, when an employee is victimized by a supervisor in an actionable hostile environment case, the court
stated,
In order to accommodate the principle of vicarious liability for harm
caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's equally
basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving
action by objecting employees, we adopt the following holding in this
case and in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, also decided today.
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee
for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When
no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by
a preponderance of the evidence. The defense comprises two necessary
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated
an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in
every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable
to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in
any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while
proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of
reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer,
a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the
employer's burden under the second element of the defense. No
affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's
action, such as
harassment culminates in a tangible employment
35
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.

32. Id. at 307 (citations omitted).
33. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
34. Id. at 807.

35. Id. at 807-08 (citations omitted).
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The third related case, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,3 6 also
involved the opinion of the Justices who dissented in Gebser. The Court
approved the affirmative defense, using precisely the same language it
3 v These three
used in Faragher.
cases used similar affirmative defense
concepts, emerging not only from a public sector case involving a school
district, which started the dialogue as to defenses in a dissent, but also
a public sector case and a private sector case that reaffirmed these types
of allowable defenses in majority opinions.
Initially, commentators' evaluations of these decisions suggested that
they would apply only in cases in which there was no "tangible
employment action," which was defined as an unfavorable action such
as discharge, demotion, negative transfer, or failure to receive an
increase or bonus.38 However, it was noted that while the employee in
Ellerth who was sexually harassed was promoted, she ultimately
resigned, and39the resignation could have been regarded as a constructive
termination.

The decisions are in a state of fluctuation. For example, Chief Judge
Becker's opinion in Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans4" rejected the
affirmative defense that liability for supervisory acts should be
eliminated under Ellerth and Faragherin cases in which the plaintiff
resigned.4 1
We conclude that Durham is not entitled to the affirmative defense
that Evans unreasonably failed to use an available effective sexual
harassment policy because the defense is only available in the absence
of tangible adverse employment action, and Evans suffered such
adverse action. The concept of a tangible adverse employment action
is not limited to changes in compensation, although Evans's pay was
certainly affected by the actions taken against her. "Tangible adverse
employment action" includes the loss of significant job benefits or
characteristics, such as the resources necessary for an employee to do
his or her job; that Evans suffered such loss is detailed [in the record]. 42

36. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
37. Id. at 764-65.
38. See Jay W. Waks & Dina L. Bakst, Employment Law: Sexual Harassment,NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 22, 1999, at B6.
39. Id.
40. 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999).
41. Id. at 144.
42. Id.
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Durham Life Insurance is an interesting case because it shows the
judges' differing thoughts as to whether tangible adverse employment
actions are necessary.43 The court noted,
Although Judge Garth concurs in the result reached by Chief Judge
Becker, he cannot agree that the discussion of when and how the
affirmative defense provided by the holdings in Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, and Chief Judge

Becker's attempted clarification of that defense, have a place in the
opinion."
The court in Scott v. Ameritex Yarn 45 allowed the use of an affirmative defense, even though there was a constructive discharge: "The court
holds that a constructive discharge does not rise to the level of a tangible
employment action in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Alternative-

43. Id. at 149 n.5.
44. Id. (citations omitted). The court further explained,
As Judge Garth reads the Supreme Court decisions, their holdings are
unequivocal and are directly applicable to this appeal without extending the
analysis beyond the facts of this case. Ms. Evans provided proof of a tangible
adverse employment action (i.e., she was made to leave her job), and this action
was on the basis of her supervisors' behavior. Here, Ms. Evans was the subject
of a tangible adverse employment action, the District Court found that her
supervisors were responsible for her constructive discharge and the District Court
returned a verdict compensating her for the damages she suffered.
This being so, the initial holding in Faragherand Ellerth attaches and binds us:
"An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee." Judge Garth believes that is
all the Court is called upon to review through the lens of Ellerth and Faragher
and he agrees that the District Court properly entered judgment in favor of Ms.
Evans.
However, Judge Garth takes no position and disassociates himself from the
discussion in Section III.A of Chief Judge Becker's opinion involving situations and
examples where no tangible adverse employment action was taken, matters that
concern the second holding of Ellerth and Faragher.This second holding provides
that "[wihen no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages," and specifies the elements
that must be established for the defense to prevail. (To the extent that Judge Weis
in his concurring opinion would make an affirmative defense available even when
a tangible adverse employment action resulted, Judge Garth rejects his analysis
as being contrary to and in derogation of the explicit holdings of Ellerth and
Faragher).
Id. (citations omitted).
45. 72 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.S.C. 1999).
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ly, the court holds that Scott was not constructively discharged because
she did not seek redress from Ameritex prior to resigning.""
II.

NOT WITH A BANG BUT A WIMPER 47

Returning to the big bang issue that plagues physicists seeking to
determine the origins of the universe and reasoning therefrom, it is
equally difficult to ascertain where the Supreme Court will go next in
determining whether to apply the affirmative defenses. But it is quite
clear that the Court is leaning in favor of affirmative defenses, which
have surfaced in judicial rulings that modified the statutes they
interpreted, in the same way the Mt. Healthy causation rule seems to
have arisen. The Court is not involved in a dramatic creation, but
rather seems to be very subtly articulating a series of constitutional
affirmative defenses. This was the case in its recent ruling in Kolstad
v. American Dental Ass'n." While Kolstad seems to be most widely
commented upon because of its ruling that punitive damages would be
available even if an employer's conduct was not "egregious,"49 the Court
in Kolstad was faced with a dilemma. If it used the traditional
Restatement of Agency rule, then when employers undertook good faith
efforts to educate themselves and their employees about Title VIIs
prohibitions, any violation by the employers could be inferred to have
been committed with malice or reckless indifference.5" As a result,
although in Kolstad plaintiff was denied a promotion, the Court adopted
the affirmative defense approach and remanded.51 The Court's remand
decision is instructive because it addressed the "good faith efforts to
comply with Title VII":
Applying the Restatement of Agency's "scope of employment" rule in
the Title VII punitive damages context, moreover, would reduce the
incentive for employers to implement antidiscrimination programs. In
fact, such a rule would likely exacerbate concerns among employers
that § 1981a's "malice" and "reckless indifference" standard penalizes
those employers who educate themselves and their employees on Title
VII's prohibitions. Dissuading employers from implementing programs

or policies to prevent discrimination in the workplace is directly
contrary to the purposes underlying Title VII. The statute's "primary

46. Id. at 594.
47. This title taken from T.S. ELIOT, THE HOLLOW MEN (1925), quoted in JOHN
BARTLETT, BARTLETT's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 669 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
48. 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
49. Id. at 2123.
50. Id. at 2128-29.
51. Id. at 2129-30.
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objective" is "a prophylactic one;" it aims, chiefly, "not to provide
redress but to avoid harm." With regard to sexual harassment, "[flor
example, Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms." The purposes
underlying Title VII are similarly advanced where employers are
encouraged to adopt antidiscrimination policies and to educate their
personnel on Title VII's prohibitions.
In light of the perverse incentives that the Restatement's "scope of
employment" rules create, we are compelled to modify these principles
to avoid undermining the objectives underlying Title VII. Recognizing
Title VII as an effort to promote prevention as well as remediation, and
observing the very principles underlying the Restatements' strict limits
on vicarious liability for punitive damages, we agree that, in the
punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable
for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents
where these decisions are contrary to the employer's "good-faith efforts
to comply with Title VII."52

The Court noted that it might be necessary, on remand, to determine
whether the employer made good-faith efforts to enforce an antidiscrimination policy.53 It is important to highlight the reference in Kolstad to
the decision in Burlington, following the statement that "[w]ith regard
to sexual harassment, '[flor example, Title VII is designed to encourage
the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.'"" The Court in Kolstad suggested a variety of affirmative
defenses, including the type of grievance process that had been discussed
in the trilogy.5
It appears that the Court may be moving very carefully toward
allowing these defenses for the following reasons. First, the original
concept of a civil rights law was to correct injustices that were quite
obvious, and as a result, litigants were regarded as private attorney
generals. The case law favored their ability to obtain standing and
access to courts and to achieve remedies for public policy reasons. For
example, in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,56 the Court noted,
"Because Congress has cast the Title VII plaintiff in the role of 'a private
attorney general,' vindicating a policy 'of the highest priority,' a

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 2129 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2128-29. See supra notes 29-38.
447 U.S. 54 (1980).
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prevailing plaintiff 'ordinarily
is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but
' " 57
circumstances.
special
The second reason the Court should move carefully toward these
defenses is because the success of the civil rights movement and
explosion of employment laws has caused everyone to be protected in the
workforce today. All individuals have civil rights, the infringement of
which is sufficient to give standing to complain of employment decisions,
even in termination-at-will jurisdictions. 8
Another factor, the expansion of litigation in this area, ensures that
employees will have access to the courts, and because of the universality
of individual rights-a dilemma created by the scope of the various
protective laws-the legal profession is adapting to this area of the law,
resulting in a litigation increase.
If one adds up the foregoing factors and reviews the recent commentaries on legal practice, the synergy created is an explosive element, and
it gives plaintiffs a "big bang" for their buck. To illustrate, a recent
report describes the conversion of personal injury lawyers into civil
rights attorneys because of tort reform:
A voice blares over the radio, "Are you the victim of sexual harassment? Have you been fired or denied advancement because you're a
woman? Don't suffer in silence anymore. Call me, William J. Berger,
for a free consultation."
Six years ago, Berger was a personal injury lawyer representing
accident victims. These days Berger seeks out aggrieved employees
looking for some type of compensation from their current or former
employer. He's joined by a crowd of civil trial lawyers who see this
area of law as their next bonanza.
"Typically I get close to 100 calls after the ad runs," Berger says.
They're buying ads on radio and television, advertising in the Yellow
Pages, sending out direct mail and spreading their names through
offices to drum up sexual harassment or discrimination cases. The
reason for the sudden shift: legislation called tort reform threatens

57. Id. at 63 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416, 417
(1978)).

58. Peter Panken, a management labor lawyer, concluded that "[one act by an
employee can give rise to 36 or more causes of action. Fire a 42-year-old minority woman
shop steward with a bad back and 4 years 11 months seniority, and you may face at least
36 different litigations ...

."

Peter M. Panken et al., Avoiding Employment Litigation:

Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90's, in II AIRLINE AND
RAILROAD LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, C941 ALI-ABA 553, 553 (1994); see also Joseph
Z. Fleming, Labor and Employment Law: Recent Developments-At-Will Termination of
Employment Has Not Been Terminated, 20 NOVA L. REV. 437 (1995) (illustrating cases and
circumstances in which the termination-at-will doctrine has been utilized).
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personal injury lawyers and the prospect of making big money from
fighting corporations over employee issues.
In the past five years, the number of lawyers who belong to the
employment law section of the Florida Bar has more than doubled from
600 to nearly 2,000. The increase has been primarily plaintiffs
lawyers, those who represent individuals rather than defend businesses.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 opened the door for large jury awards
in employment cases. Victims of discrimination or sexual harassment
can collect for pain and suffering or seek punitive damages. That
change could turn an average case into one worth half a million
dollars.
What's more, the act also created a provision for attorneys' fees. So
even if a plaintiff receives only $50,000, his attorney could receive as
much as $150,000.59

As a result, there are many continued reasons to expand the causation
test in Mt. Healthy and other affirmative defenses. This is not because
discrimination should be approved in any specific case, but rather
because virtually all employees are protected; therefore, a motive to do
something positive as to one employee may result in a negative impact
on another employee or group of employees. A determination of
prejudices and motives becomes part of a very complex situation.
Similar causation issues have troubled not only physicists, but also
artists. Even T.S. Eliot, whose verse entitled this section, was not
immune to criticism. Although T.S. Eliot was the "greatest living poet
from 1940 on," there were protests against his anti-Semitism, and, as
one of his biographers noted, "Hatred is common; perfection rare. In
him, the two were interfused." 60

59. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Lawyers Catch Labor Law Fever, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
17, 2000, at 1C.
60.

LYNDALL GORDON, T.S. ELIOT:

AN IMPERFECT LIFE 475 (1999).

In his classic

commentary, Anthony Julius concludes his analysis of this complex situation by noting,
In or about 1950, the Jewish poet and man of letters Emanuel Litvinoff read to
a London audience his poem 'To T.S. Eliot'. Eliot was present. When Litvinoff
had finished:
Most of the audience began to clap.., but Stephen Spender rose angrily and
shouted that Litvinoff had grossly insulted Tom Eliot who was the most
gentle of men. He continued with great emotion and spoke with great
rapidity. Perhaps I did not hear Spender properly but he seemed to say
something like: 'As a poet I'm at least as much a Jew as Litvinoff, and Tom
isn't anti-Semitic in the least.' In the confusion of anger, Spender was not
entirely coherent but there was no mistaking his gutsy aggression towards
Emanuel Litvinofl's attitude as it was forcibly expressed in the poem
addressed to Eliot. For his part, Eliot, in the chair behind me, his head down,
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As a result, just as with T.S. Eliot, cases are complex, and motivation

must be evaluated. Do we throw out the work of T.S. Eliot because he
was a bigot? Do we try to evaluate mixed motives and look at results
and achieve a pragmatic type of case-by-case analysis? Mt. Healthy is
of tremendous assistance because it instructs us to use a causation test
that can be applied to specific facts. In a sense, it enables us to resolve
the mixed-motive issues in an appropriate way."1

muttered generously, 'It's a good poem, it's a very good poem.'
Eliot was right. The poem is accurate about his reputation and impressive in its
outraged adoption of the language of his poetry. It is a work divided by love and
dismay, in which Litvinoff wrestles to find in the language of his despiser the
means by which he may both honour and challenge him. Eliot made poetry out
of anti-Semitism; Litvinoff made a poem out of Eliot's poetry of anti-Semitism,
countering Eliot's texts with his own. 'To T.S. Eliot' is a work of resistance as well
as respect. I wish my book to be regarded as another such work.
ANTHONY JULIUS, T.S. ELIOT, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND LITERARY FORM 217-18 (1995) (endnote

omitted).
61. This is appropriate because the issues are more complex. See, e.g., Joseph Z.
Fleming, Back to the Future: The Role of HistoricPreservationin Assigning a Minor Part
to the Taking Issue in the Land Use Drama, 17 STETSON L. REV. 689, 717-21 (1988) (noting
conservative justices may have very liberal interests in the police powers when it comes
to regulating pornography, but not when it comes to "taking cases"); see also Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074-75 (2000) (per curiam) (applying a strict test
of motivation to a city's action that was motivated solely by a spiteful effort unrelated to
any legitimate objective). The ability to find a hard and fast rule does not exist; this may
be wimping out, but it has recently been reported that a "weekly interacting, massive
particle, or WIMP" could enable us to "account for all the known forces and particle
behaviors in nature-marrying quantum theory and gravity, for example." James Glanz,
Evidence of Mystery ParticlesStirringExcitement and Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000,
at Al.

